Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development

Centre canadien pour le développement de la politique étrangère

[illegible] Sussex Dr. Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2

HUMAN SECURITY AND ASIA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS: A CRITIQUE IN LIGHT OF ASIA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS

Xavier Furtado

May 1999

5006.4E

ISBN: 0-662-30849-2
E2-402/2000E

104-00062/

The Conceptualization of Human Security in Canada's Foreign Policy: A Critique in Light of Asia's Financial Crisis[1]

Xavier Furtado[2]

Introduction

More than two years after the onset of Asia's financial crisis, several of the region's economies have been showing signs of recovery. As interest rates continue to decline and exchange rates around the region show signs of strength, many analysts have argued that the region seems poised to resume its journey towards economic growth and development. Improvements in the regional economy have caused some to believe that the worst is over and that standards of living and social conditions in Asia will continue their long march upward.

The complete story, however, is less sanguine. In some countries, industrial capacity continues to decline and private investment remains far from pre-crisis levels.[3] These persistent challenges promise even more unemployment and continued hardship. Coupled with the likelihood of continued inflation through 1999, there are few convincing signs that Asia's most troubled economies are on a *firm* path towards recovery. As a result, the declining social security/welfare situation resulting from the crisis is not likely to see any dramatic improvement.[4] Even if the region's most afflicted economies manage to post strong growth through the remainder of this year and into 2000, these economies will remain smaller than they were before the crisis for quite some time. Consequently, they will be less able to provide their citizens with the sorts of opportunities for economic advancement and human development that were available prior to the crisis.[5] The absolute number of people living either on or below the poverty line will remain large and the human security challenges posed by the crisis will persist. It is necessary for Canadian policy makers to remain vigilant and continue their close monitoring of the situation in Asia.

The purpose of this paper, however, is to go beyond the income-related effects of the crisis and draw attention to some of the more specific implications of the crisis on human security concerns in three Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Using the data uncovered during the fieldwork --- consisting of interviews/consultations with personnel from government, academe and non-governmental/activist groups as well as a review of primary and secondary data most readily available in these countries --- the author intends to provide a critique of how the Canadian policy establishment conceptualizes and articulates human security (as stated in the 1995 foreign policy statement, *Canada in the World*, hereafter also referred to as

---

[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 1998 annual conference of the Canadian Consortium on Asian Pacific Security (CANCAPS) in Victoria, B.C. and to the Vancouver branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Research funding was provided by the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and a CANCAPS Young Scholar Travel Award. The author would like to thank Allen Chong (Acadia University) and Marc Lanteigne (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada) for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

[2] During the time of research and writing, the author was an assistant professor of international relations at De La Salle University (Manila) and a research consultant to the Asian Institute of Management. He is now with the Canadian International Development Agency. The views expressed in this paper are the author's own.

[3] Murray Hiebert, "Capital Idea?", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 1, 1999, p. 55.

[4] For example, see: Lisa Cameron, "Indonesia's Social Crisis", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 8, 1999, p. 24.

[5] "Attracting Attention: The Perception of Malaysia", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 8, 1999, p. 82.

"the Statement").

The decision to focus on Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam was driven by two key considerations. First, the extreme violence and remarkable political transformation that took place in Indonesia, and to a lesser degree Thailand and South Korea, has meant that other countries affected by the crisis have received relatively less attention and analysis from both academe and the international media. Second, each of these countries is experiencing transformations in the form and function of their respective governments that began before the onset of the Asian crisis. By focusing on these three countries, the author has taken the opportunity to examine how an exogenous/systemic shock (the crisis) affected endogenous processes of social and governmental change (internal processes of reform taking place in each of these countries) and the implications of this interaction on human security concerns.

This paper makes two key arguments. The first is that Asia's financial crisis had a considerable impact in those countries which were already undergoing transitional processes. On their own, these internal processes of change already posed serious human security challenges to citizens in each of these countries. The onset of the crisis exacerbated these effects; in some cases, the crisis caused key institutions to falter and human security was compromised in ways that go beyond the income-related effects of the crisis. The second argument is that the observations and conclusions drawn from the author's fieldwork, in most cases, present a direct challenge to how Canadian policymakers conceptualize human security. Based on the data uncovered during the course of research, the author contends that Canada must reconceptualize its understanding of human security if its efforts in this regard are to be effective over the longer term. The paper includes a review of human security, as conceptualized/articulated in the Statement, and highlights how the empirical data uncovered during the course of research can add to this understanding. In addition, the author will also explore how Canada might modify its aid strategies in these three countries.

A clear, commonly-agreed upon definition of human security continues to elude analysts and policymakers alike. In this paper, the author does not provide a definition of human security; instead, he accepts the definition implied in the Statement.[6] In its discussion of human security, *Canada in the World* suggests that human security is a cross-cutting theme that includes concerns over economic scarcity, environmental degradation, human rights abuses, demographic changes and threats to health standards. The Statement's understanding of human security seems to centre on the economic, social and governance-related effects and challenges of underdevelopment. Based on this definition, the author uses the financial crisis as a prism through which to assess *Canada in the World's* understanding/conceptualization of human security.

The paper's contribution to the existing literature on the Asian crisis is twofold. First, because it attempts to go beyond the income-related effects of the crisis, the paper explores some issues that have not been discussed in the existing literature on Asia's financial turmoil. Moreover, by examining the effects of an exogenous shock on more endogenous processes of change, this analysis yields a set of observations and conclusions about the effects of the crisis that might otherwise remain obscure. Second, none of the policy-oriented research and analysis on the crisis thus far provides a thorough examination of how the changes wrought by the

---

[6] This definition derived here draws heavily from Government of Canada, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 1995), pp. 25 and 40-42.

financial crisis affect Canada's foreign policy. Towards the end, the paper will provide readers with an opportunity to reflect on the Statement's articulation of human security in light of the observations drawn from the author's research and how human security concerns are operationalized within the context of Canada's overall foreign policy.

Malaysia

Macroeconomic Decline

Malaysia has managed to avoid the intense social breakdown and extreme political turmoil that accompanied the crisis in other countries, such as Indonesia. However, despite Malaysia's relatively stronger position at the outset of the crisis, the economy has suffered considerably. The recession brought on by the regional downturn has raised unemployment levels and consequently raised the number of people in poverty. In the first quarter of 1998, the national economy (GDP) shrank by 2.8%. This was followed by a further contraction of 6.8% in the second quarter. By the end of 1998, the Malaysian economy contracted by some 7.5%.[7] As a result of the recession, lay offs and retrenchment are up considerably from previous years. From January to May of 1998, some 34,850 workers were laid off (87% of which were Malaysians, the rest were foreign labourers in Malaysia on legal work permits). This number exceeds the total number of lay-offs for 1996 and 1997 combined (26,636).[8] Although the economy is projected to grow by almost 3.0% in 1999, the new unemployment generated by the recessions in 1997 and 1998 will likely not be absorbed until 2001.

Closely tied to rising unemployment has been an increase in the absolute number of citizens who have fallen below the poverty line. In late 1998, when final figures were not yet available, the World Bank estimated that if the economy had remained flat in 1998 and did not contract, some 44,000 people would fall below the line of poverty. The World Bank also estimated that if the economy contracted by 5%, the number would rise to approximately 289,000. Unfortunately, even worse has come to pass. In addition to rising unemployment levels, the crisis also caused inflation to rise considerably. Inflation reached approximately 8.5 to 9% by the end of 1998, up from 2.7% the previous year. The largest price increases were seen in food (7.8%), healthcare (5.6%) and in rent and fuel (4.6%).

Despite the signs of recovery, unemployment and inflation continue to have an especially debilitating effect on poorer households. Food prices have risen faster than other components of the inflation index. Food also accounts for the bulk of the poor's expenditures, 45%, compared with some 35% for average households. In addition to its affect on household consumption patterns, the crisis will also take its toll on the poor (and the newly-poor) as households look to the government to provide social services at a time when it can least afford to do so. Already, the government has cut its budget in virtually all areas of public sector spending by approximately 30%. Even if the economy recovers through 1999 and into early 2000, the strain on the poor will continue unabated.

The Anwar Trial and the Erosion of Civil Liberties?

Arguably, human security concerns in Malalysia go beyond the dismissal and imprisonment of Anwar Ibrahim, Malalysia's former Deputy Prime Minister. Press censorship,

---

[7] "Economic Indicators" (provided by Goldman Sachs), *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 28, 1999, p. 80.

[8] Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Malaysia: EIU Country Report* (London: The Economist, 1998), p. 23.

internet control, the continued use of the repressive Internal Security Act (ISA) as well as restrictions on political activism in public (and on university campuses) could legitimately be seen as threats to human security. Since the early 1990s, wider segments of the otherwise quiescent Malalysian public have become more critical --- and more vocal in their criticism --- of the ruling United Malay National Organization (UMNO). This growing opposition, however, remained fragmented and its articulation was inconsistent.[9]

The divide between Anwar and Prime Minister Mahathir predates the crisis. While Anwar was once considered Mahathir's protegé, the early 1990s saw the two grow further apart, especially as Anwar intensified his efforts to build a broad and varied base of populist support from which to launch an attempt for the top leadership. One tactic was to position himself as a proponent of greater civil liberties in Malaysia, tapping into the sentiments of younger Malaysians as well as the (somehwhat latent) liberal strains of those segments of the middle class that have traditionally opposed Mahathir's authoritarianism. Anwar's net also extended to the *ulamas* (Islamic elders/teachers) and other sections of society not aligned to Mahathir.

The crisis exacerbated and intensified the two men's differences. Soon after the ringgit was forced to devalue, Mahathir grudgingly accepted the advice of his Deputy and began to implement a series of reforms that resembled closely those that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was requiring of those crisis-affected countries that had approached the Fund for assistance. However, as he was unwilling to suffer the political consequences of these reforms, he rescinded them and opted for a series of policy measures that not only put him at odds with the international financial community, but once again set him against Anwar and his growing support base. While it is difficult to attribute the Prime Minister's decision to dismiss and jail Anwar to the crisis, their differing views on how the government should proceed in the face of the crisis intensified their existing divide.

Especially alarming, however, are the potential implications of these divisions on civil liberties in Malaysia more generally. During the fieldwork, several NGO representatives and academics associated with formal and informal citizens' rights groups voiced their concerns over what Anwar's dismissal and imprisonment has meant for academics and activists engaged in 'critical' research and debate.

> In this crisis, one of the most important things anyone can do is to alert and inform citizens as to their rights. While Anwar was --- despite how the international press has made him out to be --- no saint, he did represent a more critical voice within the Barisan

---

[9] Of course, the country's most recent national election (held on November 29) could be seen as evidence of growing cogency and cohesiveness among the diverse groups that oppose UMNO. While Malaysians delivered Dr. Mahathir to the highest office for his fifth time, even leaving him and his party with the two-thirds majority it needs in the 193 seat Parliament to pass legislation virtually unopposed, the opposition claimed 45 seats, twice the number it won in the 1995 election. The Alternative Front, consisting of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Wan Azizah Ismael's Justice Party, overcame UMNO's considerable party machine and far-reaching patronage system and took 42 of the 45 seats, with the remaining 3 going to the Sabah United Party. The Barisan Nasional (National Front), of which UMNO is the dominant party, had its share of the votes reduced to 56 percent, down from 65 percent in 1995. Maybe most importantly, the Alternative Front faired especially well among ethnic Malays, the long-time Islamic backbone of Dr. Mahathir's support, and in the northern states of Terengganu, Kelantan and Kedah (the 'Malay heartland'). For more, see: "The unstoppable Dr. Mahathir", *The Economist*, December 4, 1999, pp. 27-28.

> [Nasional]. Because of him and his relatively more liberal outlook, there was room for critical discussion and it gave others like myself in the university and activist communities some freedom to disagree and debate the government's policy directives. With the way Mahathir has moved to discredit Anwar with these charges of sexual misconduct ... many of us are quite concerned. The spaces we have carefully carved for ourselves are in danger and may disappear, forcing many of us to either remain silent, go underground or hope that foreigners will articulate our concerns for us.[10]

While the Anwar trial is of concern to virtually all Malaysians, this specific community of activists and scholars see the Anwar affair as the beginning of more widespread erosion of debate and dissent in Malaysian society. Over the last 25 to 30 years, academics, researchers and activists critical of the Malaysian government have managed to carve limited spaces within which they and others could articulate views that are critical of Mahathir and/or various UMNO policies. How much longer these spaces (and, as a result, the personal security of those who exist in this milieu) can be guaranteed is unclear.[11]

NGO activists and analysts interviewed in Malaysia articulated three different strategies they could employ in response to the potential erosion of their political space. The first is to do nothing. Simply remaining quiet and curtailing their activism is seen as a legitimate response, especially among those who are concerned for their safety. The second option is to take their criticism underground and/or channel it through an emerging set of alternative fora for critical debate (such as the various artistic/performance groups that were emerging at the time of writing).[12] A third choice is to wait for foreign governments, agencies and international groups to articulate their concerns for them and/or provide funding for the creation of (often temporary) spaces for public debate and discussion.[13]

As stated in the introduction, the crisis was an exogenous shock to the (sometimes

---

[10] NGO representative (wished to remain anomymous), interview with author, November 12, 1998; similar concerns were voiced to the author during subsequent interviews with artists and academics engaged in research and voicing views that were critical of UMNO.

[11] Some might argue that the *reformasi* movement as evidence of new and growing space within Malaysian society for the expression of contrary views. Sources in Malaysia, however, warn that the movement has not yet gained sufficient momentum to solidify into a credible political force against the dominant UMNO. *Reformasi* draws on a several different critical groups, many of whom are quite new to the work of political opposition and others who bring to the movement divergent (if conflicting) agendas. Aside from the potential for conflict and eventual defection, those who are concerned with the government's handling of the crisis may lack the resolve to stay the course once the economy improves and their economic concerns are met.

[12] Such groups include Artis Pro Activ (APA), a non-politically aligned collective of artists and performers which focuses on using artistic expression to promote public criticism and debate over what they see as the increasingly closed and undemocratic governance of Malaysia. There are other such groups and collectives, a number of which centre themselves around the Five Arts Centre in Kuala Lumpur.

[13] An example would be the Asia Pacific Peoples Assembly (APPA), which took place on November 11 and 12. APPA is very similar to the Peoples' Summit, which took place alongside APEC '97 in Vancouver. The Canadian government, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, provided C$60,000 to the organisers of the APPA to assist with conference overhead expenses and information dissemination activities.

fragile) political, economic and social environment in which UMNO had guided and managed Malaysian society and the nation's economy. Before the onset of this shock, however, Malaysian politics had begun to undergo subtle change as growing segments of the population found themselves increasingly unhappy with certain elements (if not all) of UMNO's leadership. The crisis intensified the situation, leading to what seems to be an irreconcilable divide within UMNO that many fear will result in a wider erosion of civil liberties and, consequently, human security.

The Philippines

Macroeconomic Decline

In the Philippines, much like Malaysia, the human security affects of the crisis are tied to the erosion of the macroeconomy. One of the most notable areas where the crisis has had an impact is in the area of unemployment. During the first quarter of 1998, layoffs amounted to 54,515.[14] The bulk of this new unemployment was mainly in the agricultural sector and in industries focused on domestic markets.[15]

Unemployment

Selected Variables	April 1996	April 1997	April 1998
Employment Rate	89.08	89.60	86.68
Unemployment Rate	10.92	10.40	13.32
Male Unemployment Rate	9.79	9.26	12.19
Female Unemployment Rate	12.77	12.33	15.18

Source: Labor Force Survey, National Statistics Office, augmented by author's own research.

Unfortunately, other sectors of the economy remain ill equipped to absorb this new unemployment. Statistics from the Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics show how the concomitant decline of the industrial and service sectors has reduced their capacity to absorb unemployed agricultural labourers.

Jobs Generated ('000)

	1995	1996	1997	1998 (Q1)	1997 (Q1)
Industry	191	291	201	100	210
Manufacturing	78	79	36	21	
Services	593	721	659	631	675

Source: 1995 Yearbook of Labor Statistics and Current Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labour and Employment Statistics – Department of Labor and Employment) augmented by author's own research.

Inflationary pressures have also taken their toll. Early on in the crisis, inflation was not immediately apparent. By September of 1997, inflation was still hovering at pre-crisis levels as the inflationary pressures resulting from the crisis were mitigated by the slow growth in food prices. In the first quarter of 1998, however, food prices began accelerating causing the overall inflation rate to reach approximately 10%. Of course, the largest impact of these inflationary pressures has been felt by poor households and fixed income earners. Furthermore, the rise in

[14] Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Philippines: EIU Country Report* (London: The Economist, 1998), p. 20.

[15] Hassall & Associates International, *Study on the Effects of the East Asian Economic Crisis on Agricultural and Rural Development in Major Recipients of Australian Aid* (Canberra: AusAID, 1999), chs. 4.1 - 4.4.

unemployment noted earlier will ensure that wages do not keep apace with inflation. History shows that, working together, rising inflation and growing unemployment will contribute to a deterioration in the country's already poor income distribution.[16]

Devolution, Fiscal Austerity and the Capacity of Government Institutions

Much like Malaysia, Philippine society and politics was also undergoing significant changes prior to the crisis. Since the adoption of the Local Government Code (LGC) in 1991, responsibilities over several social services have been devolved to provincial and/or local government units (LGUs). In areas such as health care, where the process of decentralization has progressed furthest and its effects have been most pronounced, LGUs are now required to administer several programmes that were once the sole responsibility of the central government.[17]

Unfortunately, this has meant that in poorer municipalities, the quality of social services has deteriorated as impoverished LGUs find themselves without the management, technical and financial resources to provide quality social programming. As a noted health care expert noted in an interview,

> While for some municipalities, the story on devolution is mixed, for many it's been quite negative. Aside from the pervasive resource constraints, decentralization resulted in a deterioration in the quality of coordination between different institutions/groups with different responsibilities. Under the centralized system, there was fairly close coordination between the district hospitals and the Rural Health Units [RHUs]. They would work together to serve people in their shared areas. Now, however, the district hospitals receive no support from the RHUs, leaving the district hospitals in a dismal state. They don't have enough medicines, not enough equipment and their supplies and logistics are often very poor, especially in the poorer communities. Also, they don't have the resources for to train their people; there are no resources for upgrading skills. This has compromised the ability of the system to gather adequate and reliable data on the state of health in the country and, ultimately, the system's ability to care for the people.[18]

The crisis, unfortunately, has exacerbated the situation because of the fiscal austerity that accompanied the regional financial turmoil. With the onset of the crisis, all Philippine government departments were forced to reduce their expenditures by 25%.[19] This has had a

---

[16] Joseph Y. Lim, *The Social Impact and Responses to the Current East Asian Economic and Financial Crisis: The Philippine Case*, unpublished ms, prepared for the UNDP/Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, July 1998.

[17] For more see: Government of the Philippines, *Local Government Code of 1991* (Manila: Government of the Philippines, 1991); World Bank, *Philippines Devolution and Health Services: Managing Opportunities and Risks* (Manila: World Bank, 1994); "Turning Point in DOH's Strategic Direction", *DOHVOLUTION: Health in the Hands of the Filipino People*, First Quarter 1994; Department of Health, *Responding toe Questions on Devolution of Health Services*, Parts 1 to 3 (Manila: Department of Health, 1993).

[18] Dr. Warlito Vicente, Dean, Davao Medical School Foundation, interview with author, October 20, 1999. Prior to his appointment as Dean of the DMSF, Dr. Vicente was Executive Director of the IPHC. During that time, he worked with several LGUs in Mindanao in providing training and helping them confront the challenges of devolution. In his current position, he continues to work as a consultant and advise the DOH as well as international bodies on health care management issues in the Philippines.

[19] This statistic as well as the data cited in the following paragraphs came from discussions the author had

negative impact on a variety of social areas, including the provision of low-income housing, education and health services for the poor. In health care, the 25% cut has intensified the existing deterioration of health care delivery in poorer provinces/ municipalities and will likely continue to do so. The crisis cost the 1998/1999 health budget almost P2 billion and at least the same amount is likely to be withheld from the 1999/2000 budget.[20] In an environment where decentralization has contributed to mismanagement and, consequently, a shortage of supplies, medicine and equipment, hospital budgets for medicine, equipment and rural health care delivery will be hit especially hard.[21] The reduced value of the peso has raised the price of medicine and vaccines, many of which have a high import content. The purchasing power of the remaining budgets (after the 25% cut) for purchasing and maintaining medical equipment has also been reduced as the peso devaluation puts some equipment out of reach for most hospitals even in wealthier municipalities.[22]

As in the case of Malaysia, the financial crisis intensified the effects of an internal transformation that had been taking place in the Philippines since the early 1990s. While this section of the paper has examined the case of health care very closely, it is important to remember that a broad set of social services has been (and will continue to be) decentralized to local governments and the discretion of local executives. The effects of poorly managed decentralization are especially acute in the Philippines. Of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation's original 5 members, the Philippines remains the poorest and, in terms of both economic and human development, lags behind its regional neighbours. As a result, the consistent provision of quality social services is important to the overall state of human security; inversely, the deterioration of these publicly funded programmes has severe human security implications for much of the country's population.

---

with various personnel at the National Statistics Office (NSO) several times in October and November of 1998 and, subsequently, in February and March of 1999.

[20] In late 1998, the Estrada government announced that certain areas of social spending would be exempt from the mandated 25% cut. However, the government's ability to live up to this promise will be compromised by increasing unemployment and lower tax revenues from individuals as well as corporations. Even if the government is able to shield some areas of spending from fiscal cutbacks, the amounts will likely be inadequate to meet the new demands on social service programmes that will be brought on by higher unemployment and desperation.

[21] For example, the government's Malaria Control Program will see a 27% reduction in case findings and treatments. The Department of Health estimates that this could lead to 29,000 deaths. The government's TB Control Program will be similarly affected with some 90,000 patients going untreated. The Schistosomiasis Control Program will also see a reduction in case findings (almost 300,000 patients affected) and treatments (4,680 patients).

[22] Dr. Edgar Nuñez, Municipal Health Officer, Municipality of Magsaysay, interview with author, November 17, 1999, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur; Attorney Joel Ray L. Lopez, Mayor, Municipality of Sta. Cruz, interview with author, November 18, 1999, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur; Dr. Jonathan C. Sivala, Municipal Health Officer, Municipality of Padada, interview with author, November 19, 1999, Padada, Davao del Sur.

Vietnam[23]

As the currency crisis continued through the remainder of 1998, Vietnam received very little attention from both journalist and academic communities until the World Bank released its report, *Vietnam Rising to the Challenge: An Economic Report*, in late 1998. Obtaining reliable statistical data on the social welfare/human development issues in the wake of the crisis in Vietnam is very challenging, thus making an analysis of the situation difficult. However, it is possible to take some of the information that is now trickling out of Vietnam and combine it with other forms of more anecdotal evidence in order to arrive at an understanding of how the crisis has impacted the country's economy and what some of the potential human security impacts could be.

Vietnam has been undergoing profound changes to the governance and structure of its society. The economic restructuring and reforms that began with the process of *doi moi* (literally 'renovation') in 1986 have altered the political, economic and social environment in which Vietnamese people (80 percent of whom are rural and tied to the agricultural sector) try to meet their basic needs. Much like the other two countries examined above, the crisis was an exogenous shock that lay itself on top of Vietnam's own internal transformation. As in the case of both the Philippines and Malaysia, the human security implications of the crisis in Vietnam are subtle; understanding them hinges on being able to see how the crisis interacted with the dynamics of change that are unique to Vietnam at this time.

Security and Insecurity: Objective Evidence

Because of the difficulties involved in obtaining reliable and impartial data in Vietnam, any attempt to learn more about social welfare issues must rely on the use of proxy variables and/or more anecdotal forms of evidence alongside more objective data. By confirming sources and cross-validating reports, one can begin to assemble a credible picture of the contemporary situation.

At the time of writing, the Vietnamese economy has managed to escape the debilitating economic/income-related effects of the financial and fiscal crisis that have plagued many of its neighbours. There are a variety of reasons which have contributed to this, many of which have to do with the economy's relative isolation from the global economy. Vietnam's relatively low dependence on foreign capital, the non-convertibility of the *dong* as well as the existence of several sets of regulations protecting vast areas of the domestic economy from international competition have provided Vietnam with some temporary respite from the crisis.[24] These factors, combined with the fact that some 80% of the country's population is rural and remains tied to agricultural production, has meant that, for the time being, most peoples' livelihoods have remained intact. At the time of writing, the bulk of the country's farmers were relatively unconcerned by the regional financial crisis. If anything, some of them have seen their wealth

---

[23] I am indebted to a several individuals in Vietnam for their assistance with this section of the paper. I owe a debt of gratitude to Virginie Saint-Louis and Peter Hoffman at the Canadian embassy in Hanoi, Robert Glofcheski and Vu Quoc Huy at the UN Development Programme (Hanoi), Mila Rosenthrau, PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and Ms. Nisha Agrawal, Chief Economist at the World Bank's offices in Hanoi.

[24] This is by no means an original observation. For more, see: UNDP, *East Asia: From Miracle to Crisis: Key Lessons for Viet Nam* (Hanoi: UNDP in Viet Nam, November 1998), pp. 47-48.

increase as the terms of trade for certain Vietnamese exports (in particular rice) have improved for the time being, benefiting from new demand in Thailand and Indonesia (mostly due to the combined effects of political instability and *El Niño*) as well as successful export market diversification.[25]

Unfortunately, this new prosperity is likely to be short-lived. As rice production in Thailand and Indonesia recovers later this year from an unusually poor harvest due to *El Niño* and, in the case of Indonesia, rural instability, regional demand for rice is expected to return to normal. Taking into account the appreciation of Vietnam's real exchange rate, Vietnam's rice exports are unlikely to sustain the levels of the past year.[26]

Foreign investment has also suffered since the onset of the Asian crisis. Not only are new commitments and joint ventures either downsizing or postponing their operations, but some investors have simply left. In the first 8 months of 1998, there were only 51 approved projects amounting to a total commitment of US$1050 million. Of this amount, some US$450 million has been realised --- this is a mere 56% of the amount realised in the first quarter of 1997. The decline in FDI has already affected employment levels, costing the economy some 28,000 jobs.

Much like the Philippines, the financial crisis has also necessitated fiscal restraint in Vietnam's public sector. Public expenditure, already on a downward trend over the last few years because of *doi moi*, has been reduced further by the macroeconomic pressures of the financial crisis. Rising unemployment (now at 8% in some parts of the country), the increasing number of failing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as lower import-tax receipts have all conspired against the government and reduced its overall tax revenue from 10% of GDP in 1997 to approximately 9% of GDP in 1998. Discretionary spending by government departments has been reduced by some 40%.[27] According to the World Bank, it is not yet clear if these cutbacks will come in important social areas such as health, education and welfare. However, according to other members of the donor community, it is inevitable that social programming will bear the brunt of the reduction. In reducing the government's capacity to address the social needs of its citizens, government officials at the commune level will likely have no choice but to demand new and/or increase user fees for social programmes which were normally provided by the state.[28]

---

[25] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *ibid.*, pp. 50-51; World Bank, *Vietnam Rising to the Challenge: An Economic Report* (Hanoi: World Bank, 1998), p. 4; Jonathan Birchall, Vietnam Correspondent, Financial Times, interview with author, Hanoi, February 24, 1999.

[26] Sadly, this prediction seems to be coming true. During a more recent research visit to Vietnam from October 11 to October 18, 1999, the author uncovered some evidence suggesting that regional rice production has returned to normal and Vietnam's prosperity in this area has already begun to wane. See: "Vietnam Sources: Statistics", *Vietnam Economic Times*, Issue 68 (October 1999), pp. 36-37.

[27] At the time of writing, this figure is unconfirmed. It was first relayed to the author during his interview with Mr. Peter Hoffman on 22 February. It was subsequently confirmed by Mr. Rodney Hatfield at UNICEF (Hanoi) who had obtained it through his various discussions with Vietnamese government officials from a variety of ministries, including the Ministry of Labour Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA).

[28] Rodney Hatfield, Senior Programme Officer, UNICEF - Vietnam, interview with author, Hanoi, February 24, 1999. An interesting additional consequence of the fiscal challenge brought on by the crisis is its impact on the work of national and international development agencies based in Hanoi. Several of UNICEF's programmes are undertaken jointly with relevant ministries in the Vietnamese government. The 40% cutback has eroded the government's capacity to work effectively with agencies like UNICEF and the

One such area is health care. Before the beginning of *doi moi* in 1986, Vietnam had an impressive health care infrastructure which provided extensive coverage through a relatively dense network of central, provincial and district hospitals as well as commune health care centres. Even well into the early 1990s, Vietnam had 170 commune health centres per million which compared favourably coverage elsewhere in Asia.[29] Through the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, Vietnam's health care system has encountered growing difficulties. Because the fiscal austerity imposed by *doi moi* meant that the government was no longer able to support these centres and the attenuating public health programmes.

With virtually no resources coming from the now defunct commune cooperatives, local health provision has suffered dramatically. The use of contraceptives among lesser-educated women has dropped, resulting in birth rates that are significantly higher by international standards. Approximately 40% of all children remain malnourished; predictably, malnutrition is significantly higher in rural areas than in urban centres. Some 65% of the sick now opt for 'self-treatment', which includes obtaining and using medication without consulting and guidance from a trained doctor. As expected, this phenomenon is especially acute among the poorest of the poor; around 70% of the poorest quintile choose self-medication as compared to 55% among the wealthiest. In the context of the crisis, where all government ministries have been required to reduce discretionary spending by 40%, the situation is likely to worsen.

The growing gap in Vietnam's health care system highlights a potential role that Canada might play in helping Vietnam confront the effects of the crisis. Rather than focusing its efforts on poverty alleviation, Canadian policy in Vietnam should broaden its focus so that over the medium- to long-term it can help to prevent 'poverty exacerbation'.

Human Security and Insecurity: Subjective Views

As with both the Philippine and Malaysian cases, the implications of the crisis have gone beyond the realm of income/poverty and government spending. Because some 80% of the population lives in rural areas and is relatively isolated from mass media, the impact of the regional crisis is virtually unknown to many in the country. Combined with government controls on the dissemination of information, many Vietnamese people have very little conception of how the crisis could diminish their own expectations and livelihoods over the next few years. In order to gauge this, one must draw on examples of individual or group behaviour that reflects (either implicitly or explicitly) some assessment of the future.

Borrowing behaviour is one such indicator. Arguably, decisions to borrow are based on some expectation as to whether or not the future will continue to deliver sufficient prosperity to allow the borrower to pay back the loan. Normally, it is difficult to gain access to reliable information in the banking sector. However, the Vietnam-Canada Rural Finance Project, a relatively new micro-credit lending scheme established by Développment international

---

UNDP in addressing important social sector priorities, in particular poverty alleviation. This is something of a unique problem encountered by aid agencies operating in countries where the state has a strong role. Because the Vietnamese government requires foreign agencies to direct their efforts through the state apparatus, there is very little room for donor agencies to redirect their efforts towards the local level and engage directly with non-state actors to confront various human security challenges.

[29] China, for example, has only 63 health centres per million while Indonesia has 32 and Thailand has 141.

Desjardins (DID) in conjunction with CIDA, yields some reliable and interesting data.[30]

Since its inception, DID's system has grown from approximately 269,000 loans at the end of 1995 to 734,796 loans by December 1998. Since the onset of the Asian crisis in July 1997, the number of loans granted continued to increase steadily from 385,480. The average size of the loans has also increased from C$395 to C$464 in the same period.[31] While DID does not impose any limitations on the use of its loans, virtually all of them are used for agricultural production. VIBARD and DID are still unable to satisfy the backlog of demand for credit in Vietnam. The ongoing success of the programme, even within the context of the crisis, suggests that farmers still see a potential market for their goods. They do not see their economic well being as being threatened by the crisis; at a subjective level, they do not perceive threats to their human security.

The danger, of course, is that Vietnamese people may simply be unaware of how their welfare could be affected by the crisis in the near future, especially if the government in Hanoi continues to deny that the crisis has had a somewhat detrimental impact on the Vietnamese economy.

Much like the Philippines, Vietnam's governance has been experiencing an important transformation with human security effects all its own. As with any country in transition, the change from a centrally planned economy to one that is market-driven will hurt those that are least prepared and/or most vulnerable. The Asian crisis, however, adds another dimension, the implications of which are even more acute. Arguably, the threats posed by *doi moi* are controllable as the state administers the pace and controls the nature of the economic, political and social transformation. In such an environment, vulnerable sectors of the population have a better chance of adapting and surviving with assistance from the state sector. Unfortunately, the pace and nature of change wrought by the crisis is outside of the government's control. While the Vietnamese economy is, arguably, insulated from the immediate effects of the crisis, the evidence presented above suggests that the detrimental effects of the crisis will be visited upon Vietnam, but only at a later date.

While Vietnam's relative isolation from the global economy seems to have served it well, over the long run it may prove to be the source of profound difficulties with respect to human security. From a human security perspective, the inability/failure of people to actively interpret their environment, understand the implications of exogenous shocks to that system (whether it is due their own shortcomings or their poor access to information), perceive their own vulnerability and plan/act accordingly is alarming. While the exogenous shock (the crisis) has intensified some of the negative effects of economic liberalization (e.g., in health care), it seems as if other

---

[30] Through the late 1980s and early 1990s, Vietnam's approximately 7,100 credit cooperatives began to come under tremendous strain as the economy underwent *doi moi*. As the country's urban credit funds collapsed, virtually all of the credit cooperatives went with them leaving some VND 100 billion (US$9 million) in outstanding deposits. The 1990 Ordinance on Banks and Credit Cooperatives and Finance Companies spawned a widespread restructuring of the system. As part of this seachange, the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VIBARD) focused on making credit available to rural communities, in particular the poor. At this time, the government chose DID's credit cooperatives network model for its pilot project which commenced in July 1993.

[31] Statistics taken from spreadsheets provided by André Hotte, Project Manager and Field Coordinator, Vietnam-Canada Rural Finance Project, Développement international Desjardins, interview by author 25 February 1999.

elements of the social transformation (information dissemination, public exchange/debate) have not proceeded fast enough thus compromising the ability of Vietnamese people to perceive exogenous/systemic threats to their livelihood that are just over the horizon. This leaves the human security of the Vietnamese population unclear and in a potentially precarious state.

Policy Critique and Recommendations

The countries examined in this paper serve as valuable case studies from which Canada's foreign policy community can draw useful lessons. As noted near the outset of this paper, some of the findings support and reinforce the Canadian government's conceptualization of human security (as articulated in *Canada in the World*), while the remaining evidence poses both informational and conceptual challenges to how the drafters of the Statement understand, articulate and seek to operationalise the notion of human security in Canada's foreign policy. Some of the quantitative and qualitative data uncovered during the author's field work highlights new areas that are rarely explored (in either the literature on the crisis or on human security) but should be addressed if Canada is to achieve a comprehensive, fully-integrated policy strategy that assists the vulnerable in achieving human security.[32]

General Critique/Assessment

Overall, the Statement does not account for the potential havoc that exogenous shocks to the international economic system can wreak on human security concerns and how Canada's aid and foreign policy could be shaped to help others address these types of challenges when they arise. Moreover, as the quantitative and qualitative data presented in this paper point out, financial and economic turmoil has effects that often go beyond mere income/standard of living concerns and exacerbate existing political tensions and/or governmental transformations in the developing world that may threaten human security on their own. This conceptual gap in the Statement is surprising. Asia's economic turmoil is not the world's first experience with financial instability and its debilitating economic and social effects; the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s should have impressed upon the drafters of the foreign policy statement the importance of accounting for financial and economic instability in a framework that explicitly places human security as a worthy and achievable objective for Canada's foreign policy.

Malaysia

Canadian policy towards Malaysia has been centred on helping the country enhance its capacity to achieve its economic growth and development objectives. While the current economic climate in Malaysia (and the region more generally) would suggest that these efforts are of merit, more attention should be given to those components of Canada's strategy that are intended to help people meet their basic needs. It is likely that the remainder of 1999 (and possibly into the year 2000) will see continuing desperation among the poor and the newly-poor.

The Malaysian case provides an example of how human rights and civil liberties have been affected by the political change wrought by the crisis --- an added dimension of human security that has not been explored in the available literature on the crisis. While the link between civil society, human rights and human security is accounted for in the Statement, *Canada in the World* is less clear on how it should be operationalised.

While the Statement does note the importance of providing support to civil society, it

[32] Ostensibly, a more cohesive policy approach is the objective. See: *Canada in the World*, pp. 25 and 45.

does not explore the possibility that the hard-won gains of civil society and civil libertarians could, at any time, be rolled back as a direct or indirect result of economic instability. Again, as noted above, economic turmoil is nothing new; in fact, as more governments deregulate their economies and open themselves to the discipline of globalization, they are implicitly (if not explicitly) accepting the dynamic change and volatility that is inherent in an increasingly globalised system. The sorts of civil liberty concerns raised in the Malaysian case are likely to emerge elsewhere. Canadian policymakers would do well to explore the potential erosion of civil liberties and incorporate this phenomenon into its existing framework.

The Philippine and Vietnamese examples point to the different sorts of developmental and, more importantly, governance-related concerns to which Canadian policymakers must be attune. Aside from the fiscal austerity concerns brought on by the crisis, both countries are undergoing their own transformations which, by themselves, have implications for human security.

The Philippines

Canada's development assistance in the Philippines is channeled through a series of bilateral as well as multilateral programmes. At the bilateral level, the Country Development Policy Framework (CDPF) is the overarching framework for Canada's bilateral assistance.[33] The CDPF is meant to highlight and focus resources on two of CIDA's six key priorities: good governance and private sector development.[34] The remaining four priorities are to be integrated into CIDA's programming as crosscutting themes. In doing so, the CDPF focuses on the following objectives: promoting responsible governance, building Philippine private sector capabilities and strengthening the capacity of democratic institutions, NGOs and peoples' organisations. Within the context of the CDPF, the bulk of Canadian assistance to the Philippines is focused on the two geographic areas that are widely perceived as the country's poorest, the Western Visayas and Mindanao.

In the Philippines, ongoing efforts to decentralize and devolve the administration of public social programming is a dynamic that Canadian policy must consider if it is to provide effective and useful assistance over the short- and long-term. As the Philippine case shows, devolution and decentralization, if not managed properly, can threaten the livelihoods of those who rely on government social services. The detrimental effects of devolution experienced in some low-income communities have been exacerbated by the crisis, thus aggravating existing human security challenges and concerns.[35]

---

[33] This section draws on official documents describing the CDPF and CIDA's objectives more generally. For more, please see: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/manila/ENGLISH/devcoop/menu-e.htm.

[34] CIDA's six priorities are: basic human needs; women in development; infrastructure services; good governance, human rights and democracy; private sector development; and the environment. For more, see: CIDA, *CIDA and International Cooperation: Canada's Role in International Development* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada). These were reiterated in the 1995 Foreign Policy Statement, *Canada in the World*.

[35] For more on how devolution has contributed to an erosion of health care services in low-income municipalities, see: Department of Health, Regional Health Office No. XI, *Annual Report 1991* (Manila: Department of Health, 1991); Department of Health, Regional Field Office No. XI, *1997 Annual Report* (Manila: Department of Health, 1997); Juan A. Perez III, "Seven Years of Health Devolution: An Assessment", *Health Beat (Supplement)*, October 9, 1998, pp. 8-12.

The Philippine case is a useful and instructive one for Canadian policymakers on a number of fronts. The empirical data provided in this paper point to possible changes in Canada's strategy in the Philippines. In the context of the crisis and the trend towards the decentralization of social services in the Philippines, the Canadian government should consider refocusing its strategy. While the promotion of good governance and nurturing the private sector (as prescribed in CDPF) are laudable goals, more attention should be put towards assisting local governments in confronting the more basic challenges they face as a result of decentralisation --- challenges that have been exacerbated by the fiscal austerity of the financial crisis.[36]

At a more general level, the Philippine case also points to a conceptual gap in how the Canadian government understands the potential threats to human security. Those portions of *Canada in the World* that address explicitly the notion of human security do not adequately account for widespread trends and dynamics taking place in the developing world.[37] The movement towards devolution and decentralization, for example, is not unique to the Philippines; decentralization has been occurring (and will continue to take place) in several developing countries (a function of globalization and the growing importance of transnational linkages).[38] This points to the importance of capacity building and institutional strengthening, especially at the local level. While the Statement does address these specific concepts, it does not account for the more general phenomena that drive and create the need for capacity building/institutional strengthening initiatives. If Canadian policymakers are to have a comprehensive understanding of the potential threats to human security that are likely to emerge over the short- to medium-term in the developing world (and then devise strategies to meet these challenges), their framework must be altered to more explicitly account for these sorts of important shifts and changes in public administration and governance.

Vietnam

Canadian assistance to Vietnam is centred on four key objectives: economic and administrative reform; poverty alleviation; private sector development and the promotion of good governance and civil society. Canada's aid program in Vietnam, however, has met with little success. As pointed out by CIDA officials in Hanoi, the programme has failed in a number of respects, most specifically in the areas of poverty alleviation and promoting good governance and civil society.[39]

---

[36] In this regard, Canada may have much to share with the Philippines. Canada's own efforts at navigating the potentially treacherous waters of the decentralisation and developing a federal structure with shared powers and responsibilities may be a useful model for Philippine officials to examine.

[37] The closest that *Canada in the World* comes to addressing these sorts of dynamics is on page 45 under the heading "Guidelines for Effective Programming". While there is no specific reference to devolution, the Statement does note that programming should be based on, among other things, "Knowledge of Local Context". While this may be adequate for a general policy statement, a more specific listing of key themes and dynamics that could alter the human security equation in developing countries would be useful in arriving at a clearer understanding of the potential threats.

[38] The existing literature on decentralization and its impact on health care is extensive. See: Anne Mills *et al.*, eds. , *Health System Decentralization: Concepts, issues and country experience* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1990); G. Arbona and A.B. Ramirez de Avellano, *Regionalization of health care serivces: The Puerto Rican experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); P. Vaughan *et al.*, "The importance of decentralized management", *World Health Forum*, vol. 5 (1984).

[39] Peter Hoffman, Head of Aid, CIDA Section, Canadian Embassy, interview with author, Hanoi, February

Vietnam presents Canadian policy with a unique opportunity to address both the short- as well long-term challenges emerging there. It also presents policymakers with a richer understanding of what constitutes human insecurity and the sorts of policies that are necessary (other than those presently articulated in *Canada in the World*).

Over the short-term, the emerging need-capability gap in Vietnam's national health care system (in particular the need for preventative care, rather than just curative services) suggests new areas and opportunities for Canadian policy. At a general level, Canada would want to ensure that, in the short- to medium-term, Vietnam is able to confront the shortcomings in its health care system. Over the longer term, Canada's development strategy should seek to ensure that the institutional capacity of the country's health care system is strengthened, especially at the local level. This would help Canada to better fulfill its poverty alleviation objectives.

The shortcomings of the national health care system reflect a more general challenge in Vietnam at this time. Because of the changes demanded by *doi moi*, and the additional fiscal challenges posed by the crisis, the provision of social services at the rural/commune level has suffered considerably, leaving rural dwellers less well-off than their urban counterparts. If one accepts that the deleterious affects of the crisis will be visited upon Vietnam at a later date, then the situation is likely to get worse. In a variety of areas, Canada has the opportunity to take some pre-emptive action in helping rural governments confront these oncoming challenges through early action/assistance. The scope of activity could go beyond health care to include education, social security and employment creation.

Conclusion: Much Work to Be Done

The author undertook this project as an attempt to assess/examine the human security implications of the financial crisis in selected Southeast Asian countries and to suggest how these could affect Canadian foreign policy. In doing so, the author also hoped to lend some clarity to the notion of human security. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence presented in this paper has not clarified human security; if anything, it has uncovered new dimensions which further complicate an already contentious idea that some believe is too vague to be useful. While this study has possibly enriched the idea of human security, it has not answered the (arguably most important) question "what is human security?" nor has it clarified how resources should be prioritised in order to achieve it. Instead, the author accepted the definition of human security implied in *Canada in the World*. While the Statement does not provide a clear definition of human security, it suggests that human security is about protecting individuals from threats to their well-being, in particular those that result from economic deprivation.

As noted in the introduction, the author has focused on a unique set of variables in examining the human security implications of the Asian crisis. By examining the interplay of the crisis with internal processes of social and governmental transformation, a useful prism was created through which to assess and critique the Canadian policy establishment's conceptualization of human security. The approach allowed the author to go beyond the understanding of human security as articulated in the Statement and other Canadian policy documents[40] and make criticisms and policy recommendations (discussed in the previous

---

22, 1999.

[40] Aside from *Canada in the World* and *CIDA and International Cooperation: Canada's Role in International Development* (both cited earlier), see: Canadian International Development Agency, *Report*

section) that might have otherwise been missed. Not only does the data presented in this paper point to the immediate and medium-term economic/poverty-related effects of the crisis, but the author's examination of human rights concerns in Malaysia and the challenges to state-run social services in the Philippines and Vietnam enables readers to go beyond the economic dimension of human security and see clearly other concerns and issues that impinge on human security.

The sorts of dynamics and concerns noted in this paper are likely to sustain themselves over the medium- and long-term. The domestic issues and transformations discussed here will continue to play themselves out --- Prime Minister Mahathir has been re-elected; the Philippines continues to grapple with the challenges of the 1991 Local Government Code; and Vietnam's renovations are far from over. Furthermore, these sorts of transformations --- and the challenges they present --- will affect other countries that are presently at different stages in their political and economic development. Countries like Indonesia will undergo several different sorts of domestic changes and reforms[41]; much like those in Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, they will have human security implications all their own and, should another regional crisis erupt, we can expect to see several of the same sorts of dynamic effects noted in this paper. In larger and poorer countries like China and India, the horror stories could be endless. At a more systemic level, financial crises akin to the one that has gripped Asia are likely to happen again in Asia and elsewhere. Economic and financial crises are unavoidable. As more governments choose to liberalize their economies in order to cope with the pressures of globalization, they are also choosing to accept the volatility that tends to accompany increased economic liberalization.

The approach used in this paper highlights some of the long-term transformations that are taking place in the developing world. These changes, driven by external as well as internal phenomena, can have severe effects on human development and security concerns throughout the developing world. These are the sorts of challenges that Canadian policymakers must address if they wish to devise a robust foreign policy that can meet human security challenges well into the future.

---

to Parliament: Canada's Participation in the Regional Development Banks 1996 and 1997 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998).

[41] Iyanatul Islam, Special Advisor, UN Special Facility for Indonesia's Recovery (UNSFIR), discussion with author, September 22, 1999, Jakarta, Indonesia. In particular, Dr. Islam pointed to the Indonesian government's plans to decentralise several sets of powers and responsibilities to provincial and local governments once the election was completed.

References

Books, Journal Articles and Reports

Cameron, Lisa. "Indonesia's Social Crisis", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 8, 1999, 24.

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). *CIDA and International Cooperation: Canada's Role in International Development* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1998).

Dao Van Hung with André Hotte. *Study Case: People's Credit Funds in Vietnam* (Ottawa: Développement international Desjardins, 1998).

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). *Canada in the World: Government Statement* (Ottawa: Her Majest Queen in Right of Canada, 1995).

Department of Health, Regional Health Office No. XI. *Annual Report 1991* (Manila: Department of Health, 1991).

Department of Health, Regional Field Office No. IX. *1997 Annual Report* (Manila: Department of Health, 1997).

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). *Malaysia: EIU Country Report* (London: The Economist, 1998).

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). *Philippines: EIU Country Report* (London: The Economist, 1998).

Emerging Market Research Services (EMRS). "Firmly on the Path to Recovery? Malaysia's New Budget and Prospects for Growth in 1999", *Outlook: The Newsletter of Emerging Market Research Services*, Spring/Summer 1999.

Far Eastern Economic Review "Attracting Attention: The Perception of Malaysia", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 8, 1999, 82.

Hassall & Associates International. *Study on the Effects of the East Asian Economic Crisis on Agricultural and Rural Development in Major Recipients of Australian Aid* (Australia: AusAID, 1999).

Hiebert, Murray. "Capital Idea?", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 1, 1999, p. 55.

Long, Lynellyn D. Long. [abstract of] *Young Women's Employment in Vietnam: Changing Patterns from Doi Moi to the Asian Financial Crisis* (Hanoi: Population Council Vietnam, forthcoming 1999).

Mills, Ann *et al.*, eds., *Health System Decentralization* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1990).

Ministry of Finance, *Economic Report 1998/99* (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Finance, 1998).

Ministry of Planning and Investment, *National Programme for Hunger Eliminiation and Poverty Reduction in Vietnam* (Hanoi: Government of Vietnam, 1996).

Perez, Juan A. "Seven Years of Health Devolution: An Assessment", *Health Beat (Supplement)*, October 9, 1998, pp. 8-12.

Poon Yew Hoe et al. *1999 Budget Commentary* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants, 1998).

Population Council Vietnam, *International Seminar on Internal Migration: Implications for Migration Policy in Vietnam* (Hanoi: Population Council Vietnam, 1998).

Socialist Republic of Vietnam. *Socio-Economic Development and Stabilisation Policy in the Context of the Regional Financial and Economic Crisis. Government Report to the Consultative Group Meeting* (Hanoi: Government of Vietnam, 1998).

United Nations Viet Nam. *Expanding Choices for the Rural Poor: Human Development in Viet Nam* (Hanoi: United Nations Viet Nam, 1998).

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *The Dynamics of Internal Migration in Viet Nam* (Hanoi: UNDP Viet Nam, December 1998).

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *East Asia: From Miracle to Crisis. Key Lessons for Viet Nam* (Hanoi: UNDP Viet Nam, November 1998).

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Globalization: Its Effects on Growth and Equity: Proceedings of the Third Sustainable Human Development Forum* (Quezon City: Human Development Network, 1998).

World Bank. *Vietnam: Advancing Rural Development from Vision to Action. A Report for the Consultative Group Meeting for Vietnam December 7-8, 1998* (Hanoi: World Bank, 1998).

World Bank. *Vietnam Rising to the Challenge: An Economic Report* (Hanoi: World Bank, 1998).

Interviews, Discussion and Consultations

Abod, Azizah. Under-Secretary, Policy Division, Ministry of Defence, Kuala Lumpur, November 9, 1998.

Anh, Dang Nguyen. Manager, Population Council, Hanoi, February 26, 1999.

Anonymous, Kuala Lumpur, November 10, 1998.

Anonymous, Kuala Lumpur, November 12, 1998.

Baginda, Abdul Razak. Executive Director, Malaysian Strategic Research Center, Kuala Lumpur, November 12, 1998.

Balfour, Frederik. Deputy Bureau Chief, Agence France-Presse, Hanoi, February 25, 1999.

Birchall, Jonathan. Vietnam Correspondent, Financial Times, Hanoi, February 24, 1999.

Glofcheski, Robert P. Senior Economist, UNDP, Hanoi, February 24, 1999.

Hatfield, Rodney J. Senior Programme Officer, UNICEF, Hanoi, February 24, 1999.

Hoffman, Peter. Head of Aid, CIDA Section, Canadian Embassy, Hanoi, February 22, 1999.

Hotte, André. Project Manager and Field Coordinator, Développement international Desjardins, Hanoi, February 25, 1999.

Hussain, Nazirah. Policy Planning Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, November 11, 1998.

Leong, Stephen. Assistant Director-General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, November 10, 1998.

Lux, Steven. Regional Program Manager, Population and Development International, Hanoi, February 23, 1999.

Patiño, Oliver. Consultant, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Manila, June 27, 1999.

Rosenthal, Mila. PhD Candidate, London School of Economics, Hanoi, February 23, 1999.

San, Pham Bich. Associate Professor, Vietnam National Center for Social Sciences Institute of Sociology, Hanoi, February 27, 1999.

Soloman, Andy. Correspondent, Reuters, Hanoi, February 24, 1999.

Tham, Trinh Khac. Vice Director, Center for Population & Human Resource Studies, Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), Hanoi, February 27, 1999.

Vistan, Jose. Information Officer, National Statistics Office (NSO), Government of the Philippines, Manila, repeated discussions October, November 1998 and January-March, 1999.

Canadian Centre
For Foreign Policy
Development

Centre canadien
pour le développement
de la politique étrangère

125 promenade Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2
Telephone/Téléphone : 613.944.8278 www.cfp-pec.gc.ca Fax/Télécopieur : 613.944.0687

SELECTED CCFPD REPORTS FROM 2000-2001

Terrorism

Report from the Roundtable: The New Face of Terrorism. CCFPD. October 26, 2001.

Summary Report from the Roundtable: The Impact of September 11 on International Relations and Canada's Foreign Policy. CCFPD. November 27, 2001.

New Diplomacy

Report from the Conference on New Diplomacy: The Development of International Law. CCFPD. April 5-7, 2001.

The New Diplomacy: The Global Compact and United Nations Institutions. CCFPD. July 14-15, 2000.

Report from the Conference on 'New Diplomacy': The United Nations, Like-minded Countries and Non-Governmental Organizations. CCFPD. September 28, 1999.

Report from the Roundtable on Just War and Genocide. CCFPD. December 8-9, 2000.

Report from the Ottawa Roundtable for the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). CCFPD. January 15, 2001.

Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

Summary Report from the Roundtable on Afghanistan: Governance Scenarios and Canadian Policy Options. CCFPD. October 12, 2001.

Nile Waters Management and Links to Conflict Management and Food Security in the Horn of Africa. Tag El Khazin, Subsahara Center. July 3, 2001.

Report from the Roundtable: Judges and Peace Operations. CCFPD. March 9, 2001.

Renewing Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate a UN Standing Emergency Capability. Peter Langille, Global Human Security Ideas and Initiatives. Fall 2000.

Report from the Roundtable on Expert Deployment to International Peace Operations. CCFPD. September 12, 2000.

Canadian Peacebuilding in the Middle East: Case Study of the Canada Fund in Israel/Palestine and Jordan. Tami Amanda Jacoby, University of Manitoba. Fall 2000.

Les enterprises canadiennes et la consolidation de la paix. Jean-Francois Rioux, Francisco-José Valiente, and Christian Geiser, Université du Québec a Montréal. Le 31 octobre 2000.

New Directions in US Foreign Policy

Report from the Denver Roundtable: New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy. CCFPD. November 2, 2001.

Summary of Key Point From Presentations and Discussions: Foreign Policy Trends in the U.S. Roundtable. CCFPD and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California at San Diego, California, United States. March 20, 2001.

Summary of Key Points from Presentations and Discussions: The Washington D.C. Roundtable on Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy. CCFPD and the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington DC. April 2, 2001.

Summary of Key Points from Brief Presentations and Discussions: Foreign Policy Trends in the U.S. Roundtable. CCFPD and University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. April 12, 2001.

Summary of Key Points from Presentations and Discussions: The Toronto Roundtable on the Bush Administration's Foreign Policy - Challenges and Implications for Canada. CCFPD and the Munk Centre, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. May 18, 2001.

Halifax Roundtable on US Foreign Policy. CCFPD and Saint Mary's University, Halifax, N.S.. June 15, 2001.

Nuclear Weapons and Small Arms

UN 2001 Conference on Illicit Trade of Small Arms in All its Aspects: Briefing and Discussion. Wendy Cukier, Coalition for Gun Control. December 19, 2000.

The Ottawa Group Report on Small Arms, Light Weapons (SALW) and Non-State Actors. CCFPD and Centre for Defence Studies. November 7-8, 2000.

Ballistic Missiles Foreign Experts Roundtable Report. Ernie Regehr, Project Ploughshares and CCFPD. March 30, 2000.

NATO-Nuclear Weapons Roundtable Report. CCFPD. August 24-25, 2000.

Small Arms and the OAS Roundtable Report. CCFPD. April 28, 2000.

Examen des récentes initiatives gouvernementales et d'ONG concernant les armes légères et évaluation de leur éfficacité: proposition pour un indice de sécurité individuelle (ISI). Frances Gaudreault et al. été 2000.

Globalization and Firearms: A Public Health Perspective. Wendy Cukier et al. Fall 2000.

Borders

Perspectives on the Borderless World: Issues for Canada. Heather Nicol and Ian Townsend-Gault. Fall 2000.

Technology

Privacy, Sovereignty and Technology Roundtable Report. Marketa Geislerova, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development. March 23, 2001.

Children's Rights

Children and Violent Conflict: Meeting the Challenge of Diversity. Erin Baines, Dalhousie University; Barry Burciul, University of Toronto. Summer 2000.

Business and Labour

Canadian Corporate Contributions to Democratic Development and Citizen Participation in Developing Countries: Recommendations on Identifying and Supporting Corporate Efforts through Canadian Foreign Policy. Darin Rovere, Centre for Innovation in Corporate Responsibility. September 26, 2000.

Canadian Firms, Canadian Values. Canadian Business for Social Responsibility. May 2000.

Law

Canadian Council on International Law 29th Annual Conference - Policy Options Paper. Kim Carter et. al. December 2000.

Africa

Summary Report from the Roundtable on Good Governance and Africa. CCFPD. October 25, 2001.

Rebirth of the Somali State: Policy Options and Programme Opportunities for Canada. Partnership Africa-Canada, Som-Can Institute for Research & Development. November 3-4, 2000.

Sudan Civil Society Symposium. Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group. June 5-6, 2000

Report from the Ottawa Nigeria Roundtable. CCFPD. March 20, 2000.

Asia-Pacific

Report from the Roundtable: Good Governance and the Philippines. CCFPD. March 16, 2001.

Decentralization and Challenges to Unity: Report on the Indonesia Roundtable 2001. Centre for Dialogue, Simon Fraser University. April 19-21, 2001.

Democracy and Identity Conflicts in Asia: Identifying the Issues for Canada and Multilateral Institutions. University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies. March 2001.

Report from the North Korea Roundtable. CCFPD. January 22, 2001.

Report from the Burma and Drugs Roundtable. CCFPD. May 15, 2000.

Europe

Report from the Roundtable Living Together: Sharing the Canadian Experience. Marketa Geislerova, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development. March 28-30, 2001 (Banff, Alberta) and June 15-17, 2001 (Larnaca, Cyprus).

Report on Cyprus: Living Together in the New Century Roundtable. CCDPE. February 14, 2000.

Americas

Workshop Report: Canadian Media Coverage of the Americas. FOCAL. March 2, 2001

Canada, Indigenous Peoples and the Hemisphere Roundtable Report. CCFPD. March 23, 2000.

Canadian Voices: The Americas. CCFPD. Fall 2001.

Threats to Democracy in America. Max Cameron, FOCAL. March 3-4, 2000.

Report from the Roundtable on Canada-Cuba Relations. CCFPD. January 18, 2000.

Culture

Commerce international et diversité culturelle: à la recherche d'un difficile équilibre. Ivan Bernier, Université Laval and Dave Atkinson. 2000.

Circumpolar Issues

Roundtable on Northern Foreign Policy: Feedback and Look Ahead. CCFPD. February 5, 2001.

Foreign Policy Research

Gendered Discourses, Gendered Practices: Feminists (Re)Write Canadian Foreign Policy. Claire Turenne Sjolander, University of Ottawa; Heather Smith, University of Northern British Columbia; Deborah Stienstra, University of Winnipeg. May and July 2000.

Visit www.cfp-pec.gc.ca for more reports and other publications.